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NOTES
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A DEAF
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
SHOULD ENCOMPASS A RIGHT TO
"HEAR" CIVIL TRIALS THROUGH
INTERPRETATION
Deaf persons,' like other persons who become the object of a civil law-
suit, are compelled to participate in the adversary system to protect their
liberty and property. For a deaf defendant, however, a civil trial2 without
some form of interpretive language assistance is reduced to an unintel-
1. For a definition of deaf persons, see J. SCHEIN & M. DELK, JR., THE DEAF POPULA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 132 (1974) [hereinafter cited as THE DEAF POPULATION].
There is no universally accepted definition of the term "deaf"; the definition varies with the
particular discipline that propounds it. Id. at 132. This article adopts the functional defini-
tion used by social scientists who conducted the National Census of the Deaf Population (a
1970 survey of the deaf population in the United States): "[D]eafness ... refers to the in-
ability to hear and understand speech." Id at 133. For another functional definition of
deafness, see H. DAVIS & S. SILVERMAN, HEARING AND DEAFNESS 88 (4th ed. 1978) [herein-
after cited as HEARING AND DEAFNESS].
In 1979, Black's Law Dictionary adopted a functional definition, classifying as deaf "any
person whose hearing is so seriously impaired as to prohibit the person from understanding
oral communications when spoken in a normal conversational tone." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 359 (5th ed. 1979). The fourth edition contained only one reference to deafness;
namely, "deaf and dumb" with the following definition: "A man that is born deaf, dumb,
and blind is looked upon by the law as in the same state with an idiot, he being supposed
[sic] incapable of any understanding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 487 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
Deafness should be distinguished from hearing disorders of less severity such as being
hard of hearing. See HEARING AND DEAFNESS, supra at 87-89. See also R. HARDY & J.
CULL, EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF DEAFNESS 52-62 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF DEAFNESS]. It should also be distinguished from neuro-
logical conditions such as dumbness, idiocy, imbecility, or muteness. For some insights into
the perceptions of a deaf person, as related by a deaf attorney, see L. MEYERS, THE LAW
AND THE DEAF 8-13 (1964).
2. For purposes of this Note, the term "civil trial" denotes standard civil courtroom
litigation, both at law and in equity, of liberty and property interests. Note, however, that
the arguments presented in support of a right to interpretation in civil trials may apply with
equal force to other proceedings that fall within the broad class of noncriminal adjudication.
State statutes providing for mandatory or permissive interpretation use a variety of terms to
characterize the type of proceeding to which the statute applies, including "civil action,"
"civil proceeding," and "civil trial." For a list of these statutes, see note 30 infra.
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ligible and empty ritual. In an uninterpreted trial, a deaf defendant's right
to be heard in his own defense is significantly impaired, i.e., identification
by the deaf defendant of factual misstatements is highly improbable and
the opportunity for effective confrontation is correspondingly diminished.
Furthermore, participation in defensive strategy through communication
with counsel during the trial phase is critically impaired. In effect, deaf
defendants are functionally excluded from uninterpreted trials. One court,
noting the impact of functional exclusion upon a deaf defendant's constitu-
tional rights, characterized mere physical appearance at an uninterpreted
trial as "[ujseless, bordering on the farcical." 3
Despite the apparent injustice of proceeding in the functional absence of
a deaf defendant, language assistance is generally not a legal entitlement in
civil trials. The common law does not recognize a right to interpretation.
Moreover, a survey of federal statutory law reveals that a right to interpre-
tation of civil trials is not available in federal actions between private par-
ties, which comprise the vast majority of federal civil actions.4 At the state
level, twenty-two jurisdictions and the District of Columbia do not provide
a statutory right to interpretation of civil trials.5 In the remaining twenty-
eight states, the right to intrepretation is often circumscribed by provisions
that place responsibility for compensation of an interpreter upon the deaf
defendant.6 Finally, an entitlement to interpretation of civil trials cannot
be found in the textual provisions of the state or federal constitutions. Yet,
it is a well-established constitutional principle that persons threatened by
governmental deprivation of liberty or property possess a right to be heard
in their own defense.7 This procedural due process guarantee, derived
from the fifth and fourteenth amendments, has been held implicitly to re-
3. Terry v. State, 21 Ala. 100, 102 (1925) (court refused to appoint an interpreter for
deaf defendant accused of murder; held reversible error even though the deaf defendant was
represented by counsel). While Terry involved a criminal proceeding, arguably the judge's
observations regarding the impact of functional exclusion upon the deaf defendant's ability
to participate meaningfully in the proceeding is equally applicable to a civil proceeding. See
Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181, 189, 578 P.2d 94, 98, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1978)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979) (Spanish-speaking defendants
who are denied a court-appointed interpreter are "forced to stand by while their possessions
and dignity are stripped from them").
4. See note 39 infra.
5. See note 30 infra.
6. See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
7. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ("no doubt exists that notice and hearing are prerequisite to due proc-
ess in civil proceedings"); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(at a minimum, due process requires notice and opportunity for an appropriate hearing prior
to deprivation of life, liberty, or property); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("the
fundamental requisite of due process law is the opportunity to be heard").
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quire a variety of procedures that are incidental to adjudicative processes.8
Although the right to interpretation has not been subjected to a due proc-
ess analysis, it may be precisely the type of incidental procedure that is
necessary to achieve fairness in civil trials that involve deaf defendants.
To assess the constitutional sufficiency of an uninterpreted trial, Section
I of this Note examines the nature and extent of functional impairment
experienced by a deaf defendant who does not receive interpretive lan-
guage assistance of any kind. In addition, the utility of interpretive and
noninterpretive modes of communication as means of securing participa-
tion in the trial will be evaluated. Section II surveys state and federal law
to identify existing sources of a right to interpretation. Finally, Section III
applies the Supreme Court's current due process methodology established
in Mathews v. Eldridge9 to determine whether interpretation is a constitu-
tionally required incident of procedural due process for deaf defendants."l
8. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process required notice, oral
hearing, confrontation, cross-examination where required by the facts, right to retain coun-
sel, an impartial decisionmaker, and decision on the basis of the record).
9. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
10. The arguments presented in this article apply not only to deaf defendants but also to
deaf plaintiffs to the extent that a plaintiffs inability to bring suit due to the lack of the right
to interpretation deprives him of the right to protect property and liberty interests. See 44
Fed. Reg. 54,961 (1979) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 42.523) ("[Court systems] shall provide
appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons with impaired sensory, manual,
or speaking skills.") (emphasis added); id. at 54,955 (auxiliary aids to include interpreters for
the deaf).
This Note is not based upon decisions involving the constitutional necessity of interpreta-
tion for non-English speaking persons. Rather, the deaf are subjected to a separate due
process analysis since their relatively small number within the population distinguishes them
from some non-English speaking persons for the purposes of the Mathews formulation. For
constitutional arguments in support of interpretation for non-English speaking defendants,
see Note, The Right of an Indigent Non-English Speaking Defendant to an Interpreter in Civil
Proceedings, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 677 (1979); Comment, Breaking the Language Barrier. New
Rightfor Calfornia's Linguistic Minorities, 5 PAc. L.J. 648 (1974); Note, The Right to an
Interpreter, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 145 (1970).
This Note does not explore possible equal protection arguments of a deaf defendant fore-
closed from meaningful access to trial due to his inability to pay an interpreter. Courts
generally have not looked favorably on such equal protection arguments raised by indigent
foreign language speakers. See, e.g., Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181, 185, 578 P.2d
94, 96, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847, 849 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979). Arguably, a due
process claim could be made, however, since the procedural due process standard of fairness
guaranteed by the services of an interpreter should not be defined by the financial status of
the individual who seeks to invoke its protection. See S. REP. No. 569, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
7-8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT] ("role played by the interpreter [is] . . . so
basic that it should be considered part of the service offered to citizens as a cost of mainte-
nance of the courts, and not a cost of litigation"). This Note also does not explore the
possibility of a right to interpretation under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, al-
though it is believed this may become an important basis for entitlement to interpretation in
civil proceedings. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See note 34 infra.
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I. FUNCTIONAL EXCLUSION FROM UNINTERPRETED CIVIL TRIALS
As an analytical prerequisite to a due process inquiry, it should be estab-
fished that the absence of the proposed procedure - some form of lan-
guage assistance - results in the impairment of a deaf defendant's right to
be heard. Such an impairment may be proved by reference to the nature
of deafness, the situational uselessness of noninterpretive modes of com-
munication, and their impact upon a trial proceeding. By definition, a
deaf person cannot hear or understand normal speech. I" Thus, without
language assistance, a deaf defendant cannot hear or understand testimony
of witnesses, the judge's comments, or the attorneys' remarks. Moreover,
speechreading, which is the ability to understand a speaker's thought by
watching his lips and facial expressions,' 2 cannot be considered as an alter-
native mode of communication for the purposes of a trial. Although
speechreading is occasionally useful in the comprehension of ordinary
conversations, its value in a courtroom is negligible due to the number of
detrimental conditions that exist, such as the number of persons involved
in a trial, dim lighting, distance from the defense table to the various
speakers, individual articulation styles of the speakers, and the unavaila-
bility of contextual cues due to the average defendant's lack of familiarity
with legal proceedings and terminology.' 3 Additionally, other noninter-
pretive alternatives to speech such as public address systems and hearing
aids are of minimal value since they merely transform inaudible court-
room discourse into noise for the many deaf defendants who experience
distortion problems as well as a volume loss in hearing.' 4 Finally, tran-
11. See note I supra. Unlike hard-of-hearing persons, a deaf person does not have a
reservoir of residual hearing that can be used to perceive conversational speech. For some
deaf persons, the only sounds of audible magnitude or pitch are jet airplanes and police
sirens. Frequently, a deaf person cannot hear his own voice. Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee to Define Deaf and Hard of Hearing, American Annals of the Deaf, Vol. 120, No. 5,
509-72 (Oct. 1975). See also H. NEWBY, AUDIOLOGY 392-94 (4th ed. 1979).
12. See E. NITCHIE, Lip READING, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 341 (1930); Greenberg &
Bode, Visual Discrimination of Consonants, JOURNAL OF SPEECH AND HEARING RESEARCH
869-74 (1968). Although the terms "speechreading" and "lipreading" are used interchange-
ably by some experts, "lipreading" implies observation of the lips alone. J. JEFFERS & M.
BARLEY, SPEECHREADING (LIPREADING) 4-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SPEECHREADING].
13. See SPEECHREADING, supra note 12, at 20-35 (lists environmental, psychological,
and physiological factors that influence the effectiveness of speechreading). This Note does
not propose that civil trials be conducted to permit effective speechreading since a funda-
mental restructuring of the trial proceeding would be necessary. Furthermore, interpreta-
tion, whether sign language or oral, is an available alternative that requires only minimal
modification of the trial process.
14. See American Medical Association, ARCHIVES OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY 426 (1957)
("tinnitus" is characterized by a variety of perceived noises that compete with and distort the
sounds of normal speech).
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scription of the trial proceeding is, for all practical purposes, infeasible as a
method of communication during trial because a transcriber would not
keep pace with the proceedings. Even if simultaneous transcription were
possible, its effectiveness would be severely eroded since deaf persons'
reading skills generally are lower than those of the general population.' 5
Upon establishing the existence of functional impairment, it is necessary
to determine whether the impairment is de minimis, thus presenting no real
constitutional question, or substantial, thus interfering impermissibly with
a deaf defendant's right to be heard. The precise degree of functional im-
pairment attendant to an uninterpreted trial is difficult to ascertain, but
quantification may be attempted by reference to the physical characteris-
tics of speech articulation, the inherent limitations of speechreading tech-
nique, the difficulty of mastering speechreading, and environmental
conditions existing in the courtroom.' 6 Under ideal conditions, only about
one-third of English words are visible on a speaker's lips. 7 Thirty to forty
percent of these visible words are homophenous, that is, they appear as
identical lip and facial formations.' 8 Thus, to understand a spoken
message, a deaf person must reconstruct, or synthesize, communicated con-
cepts by piecing together component parts of the message and by deriving
meaning from nonspeech devices such as contextual cues, knowledge of
English grammar and syntax, and knowledge of current affairs. 19 There is
a high potential for error and misinterpretation inherent in the process of
synthesizing. The usefulness of speechreading as a speech supplement
both in and out of the courtroom is seriously diminished by the fact that
15. See generally THE DEAF POPULATION, supra note 1, at 51 (more than half of the
adult deaf population has not completed high school, and 28% have completed only the
eighth grade or less). Studies have shown that the majority of deaf students in the United
States do not possess native competence in English. Charrow & Fletcher, English as the
Second Language of Deaf Children, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, No. 4, 463-70
(1974).
16. Factors other than environmental conditions that affect speechreading include phys-
ical and psychological factors such as articulation, rate, homophenous words (words that
appear as identical formations on the lips, e.g., "pill" and "bill"), stress, intonation, phras-
ing, visual acuity, distance, angle of vision, age and intelligence levels, vocabulary and lan-
guage skills, self-confidence, emotional stability, concentration, alertness, patience, and
perseverance. A. SORTINI, SPEECHREADING - A GUIDE FOR LAYMEN 7-11 (2d ed. 1958).
See also SPEECHREADING, supra note 12, at 20-35.
17. See HEARING AND DEAFNESS, supra note 1, at 375. See also L. KATZ, S. MATHIS
III & E. MERRILL JR., THE DEAF CHILD IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15 (2d ed. 1978).
18. Interview with Carol Garretson, Assistant Professor of Communication Arts, Gal-
laudet College, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1980).
19. The ability to derive meaning from speech, where a significant portion of the sen-
sory information is missing or not perceived, is called synthesizing. See generally SPEECH-
READING, supra note 12, at 25-30.
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many deaf persons do not learn to speechread effectively. 20 Finally,
whatever level of comprehension is possible by speechreading under ideal
conditions is dramatically decreased by the less than perfect conditions in
the ordinary courtroom. Unfavorable conditions and the inherent limita-
tions of speechreading combine to reduce a deaf defendant's unaided com-
prehension of courtroom proceedings to a virtual nullity 21 and thus result
in his functional exclusion.
To alleviate the functional exclusion experienced by a deaf defendant,
some form of language assistance must be provided.22 Sign language may
be the preferable mode of communication for most deaf defendants since
sign language of one form or another is understood by the majority of deaf
adults in the United States today.23 Sign language features many of the
20. PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF DEAFNESS, supra note 1, at 66.
21. This quantification of exclusion is derived by considering that: (1) 52.2% of deaf
adults who completed grade 12 considered themselves only "poor" to "fair" speechreaders
in a 1970 survey, THE DEAF POPULATION, supra note 1, at 63; (2) estimates show that only a
small percentage of the deaf population learns to speechread effectively; PSYCHOSOCIAL As-
PECTS OF DEAFNESS, supra note 1, at 66; and (3) a significant reduction of the effectiveness
of speechreading is caused by courtroom conditions, note 13 and accompanying text, supra.
22. Deaf persons may benefit from manual interpretation based upon American Sign
Language (ASL) or manual interpretation using an English based code with simultaneous
lip movement ("simultaneous communication"). They may also benefit from oral interpre-
tation (lip and facial movements only) or some other form of interpretation. This Note does
not advocate limiting the modes of interpretation utilized to ensure communicational par-
ticipation by a deaf defendant; the deaf defendant's understanding of the trial proceeding is
at issue, not the establishment of an official form of language assistance. Due to the practi-
cal limitations of speechreading, however, some form of sign language interpretation is nec-
essary to prevent functional exclusion. It should be noted that the use of the term "language
assistance" is not intended to convey the idea of entitlement to aid such as welfare. Lan-
guage assistance, rather, is intended to mean that form of procedure necessary to accommo-
date the physical characteristics of the deaf defendant. See Willner v. Committee on
Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 107 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("circumstances
determine the necessary limits and incidents implicit in the concept of a fair hearing").
Thus, the provision of interpretation should be viewed as a means of securing compliance
with the minimum requirements of due process rather than a conferral of extra benefits or
privileges upon the deaf defendant.
23. Although scientifically derived statistics do not exist, it is believed that the vast ma-
jority of deaf persons understand sign language of one form or another. Interview with
Michael Karchmer, Director of the Office of Demographic Studies, Gallaudet College,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 2, 1980). Moreover, deaf adults at all levels of education rate their
sign language skills as superior to their speechreading skills. THE DEAF POPULATION, supra
note I, at 63. The predominant sign language system used by deaf adults in the United
States is American Sign Language (ASL). ASL, linguistically distinct from English, is a
language in which manual gestures represent concepts. H. MARKOWICZ, AMERICAN SIGN
LANGUAGE: FACT AND FANCY 9 (2d ed. 1978). Signs are discretely structured movements
in much the same way that words are structured sounds. Id at 22. See also C. BAKER & C.
PADDEN, AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE - A LOOK AT ITS HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND COM-
MUNITY 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE]. The rate and amount
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linguistic characteristics of a full communication system and has been rec-
ognized by linguists in the academic community as a "formal" language.24
Sign language is capable of transmitting the same range of abstract and
concrete concepts as English.25 Additionally, intonation, syntax, and other
linguistic variations may be conveyed to the deaf defendant through sign
language interpretation.26 As a practical matter sign language interpreta-
tion is perhaps the only feasible way to prevent the functional exclusion of
deaf defendants from civil trials.27
of information conveyed in sign and speech communications are about the same. Bonvil-
lian, Nelson & Charrow, Language and Language Related Skills in Deaf and Hearing Chil-
dren, 12 SIGN LANGUAGE STUDIES 211. A common misconception about sign language is
that it is universal. H. MARKOWICZ, supra, at 7, 30. Actually, national sign languages are
mutually distinct, id, and regional and cultural variations exist even within the United
States. Id at 28-29.
Systems of sign language other than ASL are also used by deaf adults. These systems are
sometimes used by some deaf adults to make themselves understood by hearing people. Id
Among the signed codes for English are Signed English and Signing Exact English (S.E.E.).
For general information on sign language, see E. KLIMA & U. BELLUZI, THE SIGNS OF
LANGUAGE, (1978); L. FRIEDMAN, ON THE OTHER HAND: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AMERI-
CAN SIGN LANGUAGE (1977); P. SIPLE, UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE THROUGH SIGN LAN-
GUAGE RESEARCH (1978); Stokoe, Sign Language Diglossia, 21 STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS 27-
41.
24. At least one standard linguistics textbook grants American Sign Language the status
of a formal language. See V. FROMKIN & R. RODMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE
28, 40, 332-33 (2d ed. 1979). See generally Stokoe, The Study of Sign Language (National
Assocation of the Deaf 1972); AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE, supra note 23; J. WOODWARD,
SOME SocIo-LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF BILINGUAL EEUCATION FOR
DEAF STUDENTS (paper presented at the Second National Symposium of Sign Language
Research and Teaching, San Diego, Oct. 1978). A growing number of colleges and universi-
ties, including the University of California at Berkeley, Los Angeles and San Diego, Brown
University, Temple University, Georgetown University, George Washington University,
New York University, and American University, currently allow American Sign Language
to fulfill the language requirement for doctoral students. Interview with Charlotte Baker,
Research Associate for the Linguistics Research Laboratory and Lecturer in the Department
of Linguistics, Gallaudet College, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 2, 1980).
25. See V. FRANKLIN & R. RODMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 332 (2d ed.
1978). See Request of the National Center for Law and the Deaf that American Sign Lan-
guage (ASL) be Considered a Language for Use in Bilingual Study Projects Under the Bilin-
gual Education Act 4 (submitted to the Office of Education, Department of Health
Education and Welfare, Aug. 27, 1979).
26. Baker & Padden, Paper Focusing on the Nonmanual Components of ASL, reprinted
in P. SIPLE, UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE THROUGH SIGN LANGUAGE RESEARCH 27-57
(1978); E. KLIMA & U. BELLUZI, THE SIGNS OF LANGUAGE 241-372 (1979). S. Liddell, An
Investigation into the Syntactic Structure of American Sign Language (unpublished disserta-
tion for linguistic department, U. of Cal. at San Diego (1977)).
27. It should be noted that a certified sign language interpreter may not always be avail-
able. In the United States, only 1,007 interpreters possess a comprehensive skills certificate
(C.S.C.) issued by the National Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf. Interview with Edna
R. Kahn, Administrative Assistant, National Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc., Sil-
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: A SURVEY OF COMMON LAW AND
STATUTORY SOURCES OF A DEAF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
INTERPRETATION OF CIVIL TRIALS
At common law, a deaf defendant does not have a right to interpretation
of a civil trial. Rather, the decision to provide interpretation rests within
the discretion of the trial judge.2" The trial judge is considered competent
to determine both the necessity for and the qualifications of an interpreter.
Although the competence of judges to make these determinations has been
questioned,29 the broad power of discretionary appointment still prevails
in jurisdictions where appointment of an interpreter is controlled by the
common law.
Twenty-eight states have modified the common law rule by requiring
interpreters for deaf defendants in civil proceedings.3" In practice, how-
ver Spring, Md. (Jan. 16, 1980). A C.S.C. is awarded to those interpreters who possess a high
degree of skill in a broad range of interpretive disciplines: expressive interpreting, expres-
sive translating, reverse interpreting, and reverse translating. Only 75 interpreters across the
country have a Legal Skills Certificate (L.S.C.) and 135 have a provisional Legal Skills Cer-
tificate. Id Interpreters who possess an L.S.C. or a provisional L.S.C. are presumptively,
though not always, competent to interpret legal proceedings. The various state and federal
statutes often require their enlistment over uncertified interpreters. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. §
1827(b)-(e) (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4001-4006 (1976); S.C. CODE § 15-27-
110 (1977). In the event a certified interpreter is unavailable, arguably an uncertified inter-
preter may be used so long as he is able to communicate effectively with the deaf defendant.
Indeed, effective communication - not certification - should be the standard of qualifica-
tion for an interpreter. In the event that no qualified interpreter, whether certified or not, is
available, the trial should not proceed unless some other form of language assistance is im-
plemented that is appropriate for the particular defendant.
28. See, e.g., Labs v. Farmers State Bank of Millard, 135 Neb. 130, 132, 280 N.W. 452,
454 (1938); Thompkins v. Byrtus, 267 P.2d 753, 756 (Wyo. 1954).
29. See, e.g., Note, The Right to an Interpreter, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 145, 166-170
(1970).
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. 27-835 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-137k (West Supp.
1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8907 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.243 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4002 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 9-205 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 51, § 48.01 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-3 (Burns 1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 622A.2 (West Supp. 1979-80); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4351 (1977); LA.
CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 1921 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48 (1964);
MD. CTS. AND JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-114(a) (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
221, § 92A (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.43 (West Supp. 1980); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-16 (Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-514 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-2403 (1975); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 390 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8A-1 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.14 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 85 (West Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.095 (1977); S.C. CODE § 15-27-110
(1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-108(d) (Supp. 1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 3712(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.42.030 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7
(Supp. 1979). The remaining 22 states and the District of Columbia have adopted either the
language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(f), which places the decision to appoint an
Right to Interpretation
ever, the statutory entitlement to interpretation is circumscribed in many
states because the deaf defendant must bear the costs of the interpreter's
services.3 Despite wide differences in their language, the statutes appear
to be premised upon the belief that an interpreter is necessary to ensure the
factual accuracy of a deaf defendant's trial.32 The effect of state interpreter
statutes is to limit the discretion of trial judges to determine whether, upon
a threshold showing of need, to appoint an interpreter for a particular deaf
defendant. However, due to the limited availability of state interpreter
interpreter for a deaf party within the discretion of the trial judge, see, e.g., NEV. R. Civ. P.
43(0; VA. R. Civ. P. 43(0, or have maintained the common law rule of discretion. See note
28 and accompanying text supra. Significantly, most of the mandatory interpreter statutes
provide a right to interpretation for parties, presumably meaning party-plaintiffs as well as
party-defendants.
The following states require the court to provide an interpreter for a deaf witness: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 27-835 (1979); CAL. EVID. CODE § 752 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
17-137k (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8907 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.243 (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4002 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 9-205 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48.01 (Smith-Hurd 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-3 (Burns
1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622A.2 (West Supp. 1979-80); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4351 (1977);
LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 192.1 (West Supp. 1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 9-114(a) (West Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 92A (West Supp. 1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 546.43 (West Supp. 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-16 (Supp. 1979);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-514 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2403 (1975); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 50.050 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A 11-28.1 (West Supp. 1979-80); N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 390 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8A-1 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-01-11 (Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.14 (Page Supp. 1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 44.095 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-5-8 (1970); S.C. CODE § 15-27-110 (1977);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-3-7 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-108(d) (Supp.
1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3712(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 2.42.030 (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7 (Supp. 1979).
The following states expressly provide for the discretionary appointment of an interpreter
for a deaf witness: ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 21-131 (1975); Aiz. REV. STAT. § 12-241 (1956);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-113 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 606-9 (1976); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 476.060 (Vernon 1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-6 (1953); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2301 (Purdon 1979).
In the remaining states, appointment of an interpreter for a deaf witness is discretionary
by a state rule of procedure or the common law. Two states, Nebraska and Washington,
expressly state that an interpreter for deaf witnesses and parties is necessary to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-401 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
2.42.010 (Supp. 1978).
31. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 44.095 (1977) (costs to the party who needs the inter-
preter). Many states with interpreter laws also require the interpreter to be certified. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 99.4002 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-108 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE
§ 19.2-164 (Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7 (Supp. 1979). Several states, however, sim-
ply require that the interpreter be "qualified," without defining the term. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221 § 92A (West Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-16 (Supp.
1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8A-1 (Supp. 1979).
32. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2461 (1975) (deaf persons cannot be fully protected
against error unless interpreters are available to assist them in legal proceedings).
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laws, the usefulness of a statutory entitlement to a particular deaf defend-
ant necessarily depends upon the location of the trial. In contrast, a consti-
tutional right to interpretation would prevent the availability of
interpretation from resting upon a factor as fortuitous as venue.
Until 1978, the only federal statute expressly providing for the appoint-
ment of interpreters in federal court civil proceedings was rule 43(f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33 Like many of the state statutes, the
rule is permissive in that it places the decision to appoint an interpreter
within the discretion of the trial judge.34 In 1978, Congress enacted the
Court Interpreter Act,35 which provides for mandatory appointment of in-
terpreters in civil or criminal trials initiated by the United States where a
party or witness is non-English speaking or hearing-impaired such that
"comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(f) provides:
The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix his reason-
able compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law
or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed ulti-
mately as costs, in the discretion of the court.
34. Compare id with FED. R. CRIM. P. 28 (decision to appoint interpreter within the
trial judge's discretion) and 3006 of the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e)(l) (1976)
(services necessary for an adequate defense shall be authorized upon counsel's request) (em-
phasis added). See also FED. R. EvID. 604 (implements FED. R. Civ. P. 43(f) and FED. R.
CRIM. P. 28(b) by subjecting interpreter to FED. R. EVID. 702 relating to experts and by
requiring an oath that interpreter will make a true translation). Another federal statutory
scheme, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), and the proposed
Department of Justice implementing regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 54,958-63 (1979) (to be codi-
fied in 18 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-42.540), might change the responsibility of both federal and state
courts to provide interpreters. As proposed, § 42.523 requires the provision of "auxiliary
aids" (e.g., interpreters) to handicapped persons where refusal to make such a provision
would "exclude the participation of such persons in a program receiving Federal financial
assistance." 44 Fed. Reg. 54,961 (1979). The proposed regulations would have only limited
application, however, since the Department of Justice has expressly stated that agencies re-
sponsible for complying with the regulations will only include "programs receiving financial
assistance." Id at 54,959. It should be noted that the adoption of regulations by the De-
partment of Justice does not militate against the recognition of a constitutional right to inter-
pretation. To the contrary, the enactment and legislative history of such regulations
arguably support the contention that interpretation has become the settled mode for accom-
modating the physical disability of the deaf in state proceedings. See notes 50-55 infra.
Furthermore, regulations such as those now proposed need not fall into desuetude upon
recognition of a constitutional right to interpretation. Rather, they may usefully serve as
models for the particularized implementation of a constitutional right to interpretation.
35. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827-1828 (West Supp. 1979). Although different versions of the Act
had been considered, but not enacted, in earlier years, it encountered no strong opposition in
1978 and was passed by the Senate upon a voice vote and by the House by unanimous
consent. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, LEGISLATIVE
CALENDAR (Final) 278, 348 95th Cong. (1978). According to a Senate report, the legislative
history of the earlier proposed versions applies to the Court Interpreters Act with equal
force. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
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presiding judicial officer" is inhibited.36 Although it is nowhere specified,
the effect of the Act is to repeal in part rule 43(f) by mandating interpreta-
tion in civil actions initiated by the United States. 37 In federal civil cases
not initiated by the United States, however, rule 43(f) continues to have
vitality.38 Thus, the decision to appoint an interpreter remains within the
discretion of the trial judge in the overwhelming portion of federal civil
litigation.39
Finally, there is no recognized federal constitutional right to the inter-
pretation of a civil trial. No express textual provision affords such a right
and the question has not been considered directly by the Supreme Court.40
36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827(d) (West Supp. 1979).
37. Where there exists a clear conflict between two federal provisions (e.g., the permis-
sive appointment provision of rule 43() and the mandatory appointment provisions of §
1827(d)), the later enactment impliedly repeals the earlier provision to the extent of the
conflict. See, e.g., United States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 605 (1897). In construing such
a conflict, the legislative intent is of prime importance. IA SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 23.09 (C. Sands, ed., 4th ed. 1972). The impact of the Court Interpreters Act
upon other federal statutes was mentioned only briefly by the House subcommittee report,
H.R. REP. No. 1687, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978) (the statutory right to an interpreter "is
not intended to supersede other nonconflicting statutory rights regarding appointment of an
interpreter") (emphasis added). The intent of the new statute apparently is to supersede
conflicting statutes. While the federal rules of civil procedure are not statutes, it is generally
accepted that they have no more force or effect than statutes. Therefore, arguably, the effect
of the Court Interpreters Act is to supersede rule 43(f) insofar as that rule applies to civil
actions initiated by the United States. The Court Interpreters Act also arguably supersedes
and repeals Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 28 to the extent that the rule characterizes
the decision to appoint an interpreter as discretionary in criminal trials initiated by the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d). The proposition that a congressional enactment may
impliedly repeal a federal rule of civil procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 notwithstanding (unless
expressly designated, nothing in tit. 28 shall supersede rules of procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court), is not a novel one. For some examples of abrogation of the federal civil
rules by a statute (Federal Rules of Evidence) see MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, FEDERAL
CIVIL RULES (1975) at 694-96 (rule 32(c) no longer "necessary" in light of the Rules of
Evidence); 835-36 (rule 43(b) and 43(c) no longer "needed or appropriate" since matters it
deals with are treated by the Rules of Evidence).
38. Id.
39. The bulk of federal civil litigation consists of actions initiated by private parties, not
the United States. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS App. Table C2, A-14 (period ending June 30, 1979) (of the
154,000 civil cases brought last year in federal courts, 123,663 did not involve the United
States as an initiating party).
40. There is some support in case law, however, for the proposition that a procedural
due process right to interpretation exists for non-English speaking defendants in criminal
trials. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970)
(defendant entitled to interpretation as a matter of 14th amendment right and notions of
fairness, integrity of the fact-finding process, and the potency of the adversary system);
United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974) (non-
English speaking defendant may have constitutional right to court-appointed interpreter
under certain circumstances); Terry v. Alabama, 21 Ala. App. 100, 105 So. 386 (Crim. App.
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In the only reported state case that analyzes a civil defendant's right to
interpretation in federal constitutional terms, Jara v. Municipal Court,4'
the California Supreme Court refused to appoint and compensate an inter-
preter for a Spanish-speaking indigent defendant. That court concluded
that, because "counsel controls the proceeding," neither due process nor
equal protection mandates court-appointed and -compensated interpreta-
tion of civil trials.42 The Jara court based its decision primarily upon the
questionable assumption that adequate community services of language
assistance were readily available to non-English speaking defendants. As
discussed below, the availability of interpreter services varies from com-
munity to community and, in any event, is not properly the sole determi-
nant of whether interpretation must be provided.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO INTERPRETATION
Procedural due process protects an individual from wrongful or arbi-
trary deprivation of property or liberty through governmental action.43 Its
guarantee of procedural fairness is triggered by a threatened deprivation of
protected property or liberty interests." This Note, however, does not
consider the question of whether due process protections are available to a
deaf defendant since it is generally accepted that due process guarantees
1925) (defendant has right to confront and understand the testimony of witnesses); Garcia v.
Texas, 151 Tex. Crim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948) (defendant's right to cross-examine wit-
nesses who speak another language is meaningless without interpretation). These decisions,
while rendered in criminal cases, contain judicial observations about functional exclusion,
judicial economy, and the preservation of dignity that are of equal application to civil pro-
ceedings.
41. 21 Cal. 3d 181, 578 P.2d 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067
(1979). Jara involved the right to a court-appointed and court-compensated interpreter for
a Spanish-speaking indigent defendant, whereas the question examined in this article is
whether there exists a constitutional right to interpretation for deaf defendants, indigent and
nonindigent alike.
In a second California case, Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 412, 130
Cal. Rptr. 675 (1976), the court of appeals decided that, independent of any statute, "every
court has the 'inherent power to swear interpreters whenever such a course is necessary to
the due administration of justice.'" Id at 423, 681 (quoting People v. Walker, 69 Cal. App.
475, 486, 231 P. 572, 577 (1924)). It should be noted that a deaf defendant's right to interpre-
tation would differ from a criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel in that interpre-
tation in a civil proceeding is a prerequisite to threshold access to a trial rather than a
method of ensuring effective representation.
42. 21 Cal. 3d at 849-50. This opinion failed to employ the due process analysis of
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), currently favored by the Supreme Court. See
note 61 and accompanying text infra.
43. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1540 (1975).
44. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 576-78 (1972).
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inhere in civil proceedings. 5 Nor does it discuss the timing of interpreta-
tion because the appropriate time for its provision is arguably during the
trial itself. Rather, this Note examines the language and subsequent court
interpretations of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to determine whether the procedural protections due a deaf
defendant include sign language interpretation.46 Early articulations of
the essential elements of due process stressed intrinsic fairness as the stan-
dard to be achieved.47 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court, in
Mathews v. Eldridge, has developed another formulation that defines fair-
ness in terms of utilitarian considerations. 48 Since the trend of Court opin-
ions has moved away from the fundamental fairness test, this Note will
consider it only briefly, and focus at length on the Mathews test as it ap-
plies to a deaf defendant.
A. Ear Articulations of Fundamental Fairness
The classical test of fundamental fairness has been articulated in a vari-
ety of ways. The unifying principle that emerges from these formulations
is that judicial procedures which threaten to deprive a person of property
or liberty must conform to settled usages, historical or contemporary, for
ensuring fairness and justice. 49  Representative versions of due process
standards include "that which comports with the deepest notions of what is
fair and right and just,"5 and "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'"
Specific procedures that comport with fundamental fairness have been de-
45. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("no doubt exists that notice and hearing are prerequisite to
due process in civil proceedings"). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
46. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (upon determining the applica-
bility of due process, the question remains what process is required by the demands of the
particular situation).
47. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (due process implies respect
for rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312,
316 (1926) (the 14th amendment requires state action to be consistent with the "fundamen-
tal principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions").
48. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (the process that is due depends
on the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional
safeguards, and the government's interest in the fiscal and administrative burdens entailed).
49. Id In 28 states, the statutorily prescribed method for ensuring procedural protec-
tion for deaf parties is providing interpretation. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
50. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S 97, 105 (1934) (felony defendant has due process
right to be present at his prosecution).
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fined by the "canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples,"" u the lessons of history,53 and, where
appropriate, contemporary practices.54
The provision of interpretation in a civil trial appears to be required by
currently accepted conceptions of fairness,5 despite the existence of a
common law tradition of discretionary appointment. Analyzed in terms of
these contemporary notions, it would be difficult to justify deprivation of
the property or liberty of a defendant who cannot functionally participate
in his trial.56 Certainly, a trial that is utterly incomprehensible to the de-
fendant does not comport with "canons of decency" or deeply rooted prin-
ciples of justice. Historical modes of procedure may have allowed the
deprivation of a deaf person's property or liberty due to antiquated con-
ceptions of a deaf person's legal capacity.57 Today, however, it is generally
recognized that a deaf person possesses all the rights and privileges of
other citizens, particularly the right to be heard in his own defense. The
twenty-eight state statutes that mandate interpretation reflect recognition
of a right to participation in civil trials.58 Moreover, national policy, as
manifested in federal statutes, mandates the accommodation of handi-
capped persons into programs administered by recipients of federal
financial assistance59 and into educational programs supported by federal
52. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945) (separate opinion of Frank-
furter, J.) (due process denied where involuntary confession used to convict criminal defend-
ant).
53. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (pumping suspect's stomach to search
for narcotics is a denial of due process).
54. To define due process in a particular situation, the Supreme Court has referred to
the prevailing practice in the states. See generally Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 11-12
(1950).
55. Moreover, any conflict between historical procedures and modern notions of fair-
ness should be resolved in favor of the latter since recognition of the right to interpretation
may ultimately result in judicial economy and secure other important interests of a deaf
defendant. See notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra.
56. For additional state court decisions recognizing a state and/or federal constitutional
right to an interpreter, based on procedural due process, see The Right of An Indigent Non-
English Speaking Defendant to an Interpreter in Civil Proceedings, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 677 n.90
(1979).
57. A. GAw, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE DEAF 83-86 (1907). Until the early 20th cen-
tury, American jurisprudence presumed deaf persons to be legally incompetent to enter into
a contract or write a will. Id at 83, 86.
58. For a list of states where appointment of an interpreter in civil trials is mandatory,
see note 30 supra. See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) ("fact that a practice is
followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that prac-
tice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the
practice 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental' ").
59. See generally Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794(c) (1976).
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financial assistance.6 ° Thus, in view of the current recognition of a handi-
capped person's entitlement to participate in activities that are integral to
society, denial to deaf persons of the opportunity to participate directly in
their own trials would appear to be in sharp conflict with contemporary
notions of fundamental fairness.
B. Balancing Utilitarian Considerations.- A Mathews v. Eldridge Analysis
of A Deaf Defendant's Right to Interpretation of Civil Trials
While fundamental fairness has not been discarded as a standard of due
process, the due process methodology currently favored by the Supreme
Court consists of the three-tiered utilitarian analysis enunciated in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge.6 This modern formulation has been used to determine
the specific requirements of due process in noncriminal proceedings by
balancing three distinct factors: the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.6"
I Private Interest of Defendant
The Mathews Court first identified the specific private interest the de-
fendant seeks to protect by securing the requested procedure. A deaf de-
fendant's interests in a civil trial may be characterized in a variety of ways:
60. See generally Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1976), and Department of Health, Education and Welfare Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 121a.1
to .710 (1979).
61. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge- Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 30 (1976). Although Mathews involved an adminis-
trative hearing to terminate social security benefits, the methodology set forth therein consti-
tutes the standard for a variety of noncriminal proceedings as well. See, e.g., Memphis
Light Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978) (public utility company's deci-
sion to cut off customer's service); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
848-49 (1977) (Department of Social Services prehearing decision to remove foster child
from foster parent's home); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977) (department of mo-
tor vehicles summary decision to revoke driver's license); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
675 (1976) (public school's use of corporal punishment with students).
62. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). There is no mathematical formula, however, and new
factors emerge as the test evolves. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)) (there "must be a mutual accommodation between
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general
application"). Additionally, the Mathews test has been labeled excessively subjective and
unpredictable. See Saphire, Speciffing Due Process Values: To ward a More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113 (1978).
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in protecting himself from a mistaken or wrongful deprivation of prop-
erty63 or in preservation of his freedom to act in a particular manner which
may be threatened by injunctive proceedings. In addition, deaf defendants
share throughout a civil trial an interest in the preservation of their dig-
nity' which interest finds explicit affirmation in Supreme Court deci-
sions 65 and in the codes of professional conduct.66 It is difficult to dispute
the assertion that an uninterpreted trial has a serious impact upon the dig-
nity of a deaf defendant. Without interpretation, a person's power to influ-
ence the proceedings is severely impaired. Decreased self-esteem is likely
to result from the experience of being "processed" by an incomprehensible
system, especially when vital personal interests are in jeopardy.
For purposes of comparing the private interest factor to the third analy-
tical factor, the government's interest in minimizing administrative bur-
dens, the Mathews analysis calls for the assignment of a hierarchical value
to the defendant's private interests. While such an assignment is essen-
tially a subjective task,67 the Court has announced that it will examine the
nature and severity of the particular deprivation and the surrounding cir-
cumstances to determine the weight to be accorded a particular private
63. The Supreme Court has recently recognized the importance of the following private
interests: a welfare recipient's "brutal need" for welfare benefits prior to a final administra-
tive termination of benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); a social security
recipient's interest in continued receipt of benefits prior to final termination, Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976); a student's interest in procedural safeguards that mini-
mize the risk of wrongful corporal punishment, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676
(1977); and a truck driver's interest in maintaining his license to operate a motor vehicle,
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977). For a general discussion of a defendant's private
interest, see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296-1304 (1975).
64. See, e.g., Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication -4 Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 347 (1957).
65. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 261-64 (1978) (mental and emotional distress associ-
ated with "feeling of unjust treatment" is compensable pursuant to a showing that such
injury actually was caused by procedural deficiencies); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-
65 (1970) (although characterized as a government interest, dignity and sense of well-being
termed part of "Nation's basic commitment"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 162, 171-72 (195 1) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (due process guarantees
the feeling that justice has been done). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (defendant retains "an unalienable interest in liberty - at the very
minimum the right to be treated with dignity - which the Constitution may never ignore")
(emphasis added).
66. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7. Ethical Consideration 7-36 states:
"Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly procedures designed
to protect the rights of all parties."
67. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, supra note 63, at 1278 (such a balancing test is
uncertain and subjective). Judge Friendly discusses the weight a court should accord partic-
ular interests. See id at 1295-1304.
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interest.68 Based upon these general guidelines, it is arguable that due to
the potentially devastating consequences of a civil judgment, the deaf de-
fendant's private interests are "important."" A particular civil judgment
may deprive a deaf defendant of property indefinitely, or it may impose a
long-term monetary obligation. Alternatively, a civil judgment may per-
manently prohibit a defendant from conducting himself in a self-deter-
mined manner. Finally, while the private interest in preserving dignity is
important to any person involved in the judicial system, it would appear to
be particularly crucial to defendants who are involuntarily subjected to the
massive power of the judicial system. Subjugation to unintelligible, for-
malistic procedures may deeply affect a deaf defendant's feelings of self-
esteem and sense of social worth. Indeed, compulsion to resort to uninter-
preted adversary proceedings may foist upon deaf defendants a profound
sense of social impotence since they may perceive themselves as effectively
foreclosed from meaningful participation in society's most powerful mech-
anism for dispute resolution.
2. Risk of Error
The second inquiry in determining what process is due, according to Ma-
thews, involves an examination of the functional appropriateness of a par-
ticular procedure in light of the decision to be made and all the attendant
circumstances. The burdens associated with the adoption of an additional
procedure at defendant's request are weighed against the probability that
the requested procedure will reduce the risk of error. The precise risk of
error resulting from lack of interpretation is difficult to calculate, but it is
clear that a high potential for error exists where functional exclusion pre-
vents discovery of substantive inaccuracy in the trial process.70 Inconsis-
tencies in testimony, for example, cannot be detected by the unaided deaf
68. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 75, 86 n.3 (dismissal from medi-
cal school was more severe than 10 days of suspension for high school students).
69. While a deaf defendant's interests may not amount to "brutal need," as was the
welfare recipient's interest in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261, 264 (1970), they are
arguably as significant as a utility customer's interest in continued receipt of services, Mem-
phis Gas, Light and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) or a high school student's
interest in avoiding short-term exclusion from the educational process, Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 579 (1975). See also Paync v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132
Cal. Rptr. 405, 411 (1976) (importance of a defendant's interest in avoiding uncompensated
deprivation of his property characterized as equal in constitutional significance to the inter-
est in dissolving a marriage through the legal process).
70. See notes 11-27 and accompanying text supra. In Mathews, the court noted that
"procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error as applied to the generality of
cases, not the rare exceptions." 424 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
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defendant.7 ' Moreover, he cannot assess the tone of comments by counsel
or the judge. Therefore, he cannot be expected to make appropriate and
informed decisions concerning strategic matters, such as compromise or
settlement, when his perception of the trial is based upon scanty informa-
tion and largely unbased conclusions regarding the course of the trial.7 2
As a practical matter, the deaf defendant's counsel, who only rarely speaks
sign language, will make most of the tactical trial decisions.73 The trial
proceeding may thus be reduced to a crude approximation of an informed
decisional process.
Apparently addressing the risk of error, the California Supreme Court
concluded in Jara v. Municipal Court that a non-English speaking defend-
ant's due process rights are not jeopardized by an untranslated trial since
"counsel controls the proceeding."'74 The court further observed that "a
7 1. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text supra.
72. Due in part to communication difficulties that may exist between counsel and his
deaf client, it is improbable that a deaf defendant will be able to perceive clearly the disposi-
tions of judge and jury and to participate in choosing appropriate strategic options.
73. The importance of communication with counsel is recognized in the Court Inter-
preters Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827(d) (West Supp. 1979). Yet, pretrial preparation by a deaf
defendant's attorney is typically complicated by communication difficulties with the deaf
client. While attorneys have a professional duty to understand fully the details of their
client's case, pretrial client conferences without an interpreter are often mere exchanges of
generalities. An attorney, however, has a professional responsibility to accommodate the
disabilities of his client where it is necessary to obtain information relevant to a case. See
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6, "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Competently." Ethical Consideration 6-3 states: "Proper preparation and representation
may require the association by the lawyer of [sic] professionals in other disciplines." Disci-
plinary Rule 6-101(A)(2) mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not . . . handle a legal matter
without preparation adequate in the circumstances." This duty may require hiring an inter-
preter for client consultations, or if it is appropriate for the client, conducting conferences in
writing or some other manner that facilitates communication. See also W. VA. CODE § 57-5-
7(a) (Supp. 1979) (interpreter to be provided for deaf defendant at every stage of the trial,
including pretrial preparation).
74. Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181, 186, 578 P.2d 94, 96-97, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847,
849-50 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979). While the court expressly rejected the
argument for a constitutional right to interpretation, it nevertheless appeared to accept im-
plicitly that the defendant had a due process right to communicational participation. By
stressing the availability of community-based language assistance (e.g., friends, relatives,
community groups), the Jara court seemed to consider the defendant's due process rights to
be vindicated. The majority's decision incorrectly assumed the availability of volunteer in-
terpreters in a non-English speaking community. Such a volunteer corps of interpreters,
likewise, is not always available within the deaf community since friends and relatives of
deaf people most often are hearing persons who never acquire fluency in American Sign
Language. In any event, Jara does not control where a deaf defendant's right to interpreta-
tion is at issue since the due process rights of deaf and Spanish-speaking civil defendants are
not identical. Each group possesses different characteristics that produce different results




non-English speaking defendant with counsel is in no worse a position
than a civil defendant who chooses not to appear at trial at all."75 In
reaching these conclusions, the court failed to utilize either the utilitarian
due process analysis established in Mathews76 or the traditional funda-
mental fairness test.77 More importantly, the court's conclusions reflect
conceptual confusion and serious constitutional short-cutting. Specifically,
the court first erred in equating the position of a non-English speaking
defendant with that of an English speaking defendant who elects not to
attend his trial. Where interpretation is not provided as a matter of right, a
non-English speaking defendant does not actually have an opportunity to
choose whether to participate meaningfully at trial with or without an at-
torney. Meaningful presence is foreclosed by virtue of the language bar-
rier whether or not a non-English speaking defendant elects to make a
physical appearance. The court's conclusion, in other words, overlooks a
vital element of the non-English speaking defendant's or, by analogy, a
deaf defendant's, right to be heard, namely, the opportunity for a defend-
ant to assert the right by participating knowingly in the conduct of his case.
Second, the court was only partially correct when it concluded that counsel
"controls" a proceeding and that, therefore, a non-English speaking de-
fendant's due process rights are adequately protected. Counsel does, to an
almost exclusive extent, determine the procedural and strategic course of a
trial. That control, however, is intended to be exercised with full knowl-
edge of a defendant's case and, if the defendant wishes to be present, with
full awareness of the defendant's observations and opinions of the wit-
nesses and their testimony. Representation by counsel cannot be charac-
terized as a substitute for a deaf defendant's due process right to be heard
since mere representation does not always accomplish the goals of due
process, i e., to be free from mistaken or arbitrary deprivations. This is
especially true in light of the likely communication difficulties existing be-
tween counsel and his deaf client. Furthermore, there is no legal basis for
concluding that a non-English speaking defendant impliedly waives his
right to be heard by retention of counsel, which is, in essence, the effect of
the conclusion of the California court. Such a conclusion would categori-
cally impose functional exclusion upon non-English speaking as well as
deaf defendants who retain counsel.
The final inquiry in the Mathews examination of the risk of error seeks
to determine the probable value of a requested procedure in minimizing
75. 21 Cal. 3d at 186, 578 P.2d at 96-97, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
76. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
77. See notes 50-55 and accompanying text supra.
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errors in the fact-finding process. 78 The probable value of an interpreter as
a means of reducing the risk of error is substantial. As mentioned previ-
ously, the majority of deaf adults understand some form of sign lan-
guage.7 9 As a mode of communication, sign language is as effective as
other languages in conveying legal concepts. 8° Its use in a proceeding
would promote factual accuracy by permitting the deaf defendant to un-
derstand the trial and to participate in his defense. This assertion is bol-
stered by the fact that a majority of the states now mandate interpretation
of civil proceedings for both deaf parties and witnesses.
81
3. The Government's Interest in Minimizing Administrative Burdens
In the final phase of the Mathews analysis, the Supreme Court identified
the government's interest in minimizing fiscal and administrative bur-
dens82 and examined any countervailing government interests that con-
flicted with its interest in summary procedures. 83 If the government's in-
terest outweighs both a defendant's private interest and the risk of error in
the absence of the requested procedure, it will justify the denial or post-
ponement of the requested procedure. 84 The Court has declared that the
government's interest in minimizing its financial and administrative bur-
dens is a legitimate reason to withhold particular procedures where the
burdens it poses are substantial. 85
A deaf defendant who offers to secure and compensate an interpreter
presents no fiscal or administrative burden to a court. Yet this type of
request is regularly denied by judges who believe that interpretation will
78. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976). See generally Note, Specifying
the Procedures Required by Due Process. Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1514-15 (1975).
79. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 30 supra. Interpretation of a trial would allow a deaf defendant to under-
stand the testimony and also communicate with counsel during the trial. The potential for
intrusion into the confidential communications between an attorney and his client is mini-
mized by the fact that the Interpreter Code of Ethics, promulgated by the National Registry
of Interpreters for the Deaf, prohibits interpreters from disclosing interpreted information.
82. 424 U.S. at 335.
83. Id at 348.
84. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168-71 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (gov-
ernment's interest in maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline "on balance" out-
weighs employee's interest in continuing employment prior to an evidentiary hearing). See
also Note, supra note 78, at 1515 n.26.
85. The Court determines the financial burden by estimating the details and costs of a
particular procedure. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 347-48.
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unduly disrupt the trial.86 A fear of disruption, however, has no basis in
fact or experience. It has been proven in the educational field, for exam-
ple, that only minimal distraction occurs when an interpreter is used in a
classroom and that distraction dissipates quickly as the novelty wears off.87
The only burden conceivably posed by a deaf defendant's request to secure
and compensate his own interpreter is the judge's responsibility to prevent
undue prejudice to the defendant caused by an incompetent or unscrupu-
lous interpreter. This duty, however, is merely a part of a judge's preexist-
ing and continuing duty to ensure the fairness of a civil proceeding. Such
a responsibility would probably only arise where a deaf defendant ex-
pressly challenges the competence of his interpreter. In light of the nature
of sign language and the necessity of effective communication with the
deaf defendant, it would seem reasonable to impose the burden on the
deaf defendant who obtains and pays for the interpreter to raise the issue
of the interpreter's competence.
A different analysis results where a deaf defendant does not, for various
reasons, offer to procure and compensate his interpreter. Concededly, in-
terpretation in this type of civil trial would present some financial and ad-
ministrative burdens for the court. Nevertheless, these burdens are
incremental and insubstantial when compared to the countervailing gov-
ernment interest in preserving the dignity of deaf defendants,88 cultivating
respect for the integrity of the judicial process,89 and incorporating the
handicapped into society.90
The cost of interpretation in civil trials for deaf defendants probably
would be relatively insubstantial.9 First, the number of deaf defendants
appearing in civil trials will represent only a small fraction of the total
number of civil defendants.92 The statistical infrequency of deaf persons
86. Interview with Betty Colonomos, Coordinator, Interpreter Training Program, Gal-
laudet College, Wash., D.C. (April 3, 1980).
87. Id.
88. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
89. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 8. Ethical Consideration 8-1 states
that the "system should function in a manner that commands public respect."
90. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
91. The cost relative to other expenses of maintaining a court system, not the number of
dollars, is suggested as the appropriate value to consider when assessing the governmental
burdens presented by court-appointed and -compensated interpretation. Otherwise, a large
nationally based expenditures could be characterized as a substantial burden, when, in fact,
implementation of a particular procedure may only present a small burden to the respective
local jurisdictions.
92. No statistics exist that document the number of deaf defendants appearing in civil
trials. It may be presumed, however, that the number of deaf defendants is small because
the population of deaf persons in the U.S. is .87% (1,936,000) of the total United States
population. Interview with Michael Karchmer, Director of the Office of Demographic Stud-
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appearing as civil defendants will result in governmental burdens that dif-
fer from those presented by some non-English speaking populations, and
the Mathews due process analysis is correspondingly different.93 Based
upon the experience of the New York City Supreme Court, which operates
the largest court interpreter program in the United States, only .058% of
the annual budget is spent for interpreters, and only .012% of the budget is
spent for interpreters for the deaf.94 On the federal level, estimates of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reveal that the annual cost of
implementing the Federal Court Interpreter's Act will be $1.8 million, only
a fraction of which is expected to be expended for sign language interpret-
ers. This figure is itself dwarfed by the total 1979-80 appropriation to fed-
eral courts of $503 million.95 Moreover, in Montreal, Canada, preliminary
studies of the state-financed court interpreter program indicate that inter-
preter services may be actually cost effective in that they alleviate confu-
sion, delay, and the administrative burdens presented by foreign language
speaking people.96
Likewise, the administrative burdens of court appointment of interpret-
ers probably would be incremental. When it comes to the court's attention
that a defendant is deaf, the clerk of the court need merely contact a state
or local registry of interpreters for the deaf. Additionally, there are numer-
ous community organizations for the deaf that offer interpreter services.
97
ies, Gallaudet College, Washington, D.C. (February 7, 1980) (figure based on the prevalency
rate of deafness established by THE DEAF POPULATION, supra note I at 16, Table 2.1, and
population statistics of the U.S. Census Bureau, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS
series P-25, no. 878 (issued March, 1980). Moreover, experience shows that not all civil
defendants choose to appear at trial, and the fiscal burden presented by interpretation is
thereby further reduced.
93. Studies show that in particular geographic areas other non-English speaking per-
sons use interpreters more than deaf persons. See The Bilingual Courts Act: Hearings on S.
565, HR. 2243, HR. 2255, HR. 4096 and HR. 8314 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., I st Sess. 771 (1975)
(utilization of Spanish interpreters is five times greater in California than for all other lan-
guages combined). See also Guerrara v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 201, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1973) (notice of welfare benefits termina-
tion/reduction did not have to be published in Spanish because the burden would totally
frustrate all government activity).
94. Interview with Don Gossicki, Budget Officer for the New York Supreme Court, in
New York City (Jan. 10, 1980). These figures apply to the First Department of the New
York Supreme Court, which is composed of Manhattan and the Bronx.
95. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-431, 92 Stat. 1021 (1978).
96. See Bilingual Courts Act: Hearings on HR. 793 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 753 (1976).
97. Interview with Richard Dirst, Public Relations Director, National Registry of Inter-
preters for the Deaf (NRID), Silver Spring, Maryland (April 18, 1980). Interpreters may be
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Arguably, no additional judicial burden will result from a constitutional
requirement of interpretation. A judge's duty to supervise the appoint-
ment of an interpreter under a constitutional standard would be no greater
than his duty to determine the necessity and competence of an interpreter
-under the common law standard. In either case, the judge must ascertain
the need of a defendant for language assistance and supervise the profes-
•sional conduct of the interpreter as an officer of the court.
In addition to the above interests, the government has three important
countervailing interests favoring mandatory interpretation. First, the gov-
ernment has an interest in fostering the "dignity and well-being of all per-
sons within its borders."98  Second, the government, on both state and
federal levels, has adopted a national policy of accommodating the handi-
capped population in the mainstream of society.99 Third, the government
has an interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system.'00 These
countervailing interests arguably offset the government's legitimate but in-
substantial interest in conserving small amounts of financial and adminis-
trative resources. Even if these countervailing interests are not perceived
as completely offsetting the government's intercst in conserving its
financial and administrative resources, the remaining government interest
in minimizing administrative burdens is outweighed by the deaf defend-
ant's important private interests in securing interpretation, the high risk of
error presented by the lack of interpretation, and the substantial value of
interpretive language assistance as a means of reducing the risk of error.
IV. CONCLUSION
Deaf persons are drawn into the adversary system daily to defend their
liberty or property. In the absence of interpretive language assistance, the
deaf defendant's ability to participate meaningfully in his trial is impaired
to the extent that he is functionally excluded from the proceeding. Yet
state and federal statutes do not mandate interpretation for deaf defend-
ants in a large number of civil proceedings, and the rule of discretionary
appointment remains in effect in a large number of state and federal pro-
ceedings. Independent of constitutional theory, the judiciary has a duty to
located by reference to the REGIONAL DIRECTORY OF SERVICES FOR DEAF PERSONS (1980),
which catalogs the state registries of sign language interpreters and local organizations that
maintain interpreter referral services. (The REGIONAL RESOURCE DIRECTORY is available
at the NRID, 814 Thayer Ave., Silver Spring, Md. 20910.) Only three states, Vermont,
North Dakota, and Wyoming, do not have a state registry of interpreters for the deaf.
98. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
99. See notes 59-60 supra.
100. See note 89 supra.
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prevent the occurrence of functional exclusion based upon its responsibil-
ity to recognize the dignity of every person who comes before it and to
preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process. On a constitutional level,
the judicial system, as an official arm of both the state and federal govern-
ments, may not permit functional exclusion since it has a duty to allow all
defendants - including deaf defendants-an opportunity to be heard in
connection with deprivations of property or liberty.
Interpretive language assistance appears to be the most feasible and ef-
fective means of obviating the functional exclusion of a deaf civil defend-
ant. Through interpretation, a deaf defendant can participate directly and
meaningfully in his trial. He can understand the testimony, take notice of
the statements by counsel and the judge, confer with his attorney and gen-
erally participate actively in his own defense. If indeed interpretation is a
necessary incident of the deaf defendant's right to be heard, then the rule
of discretionary appointment must fall. As a due process right, the right to
interpretation is personal to the deaf defendant and, absent extraordinary
circumstances, only he may waive the right. Thus, any civil adjudication
of a deaf defendant's interests in property or liberty made in the absence of
an appropriate form of interpretive language assistance is constitutionally
void.
Gregg F Re/yea
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